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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relevance of economic theory to the rail 
privatisation proposals contained in the Railways Act 1993. After a review of the 
latest rail privatisation literature four major themes emerged: 
(1) Contestability and Barriers to Entry. 
(2) Franchising. 
(3) Vertical Integration. 
(4) Horizontal Integration. 
Following a short review of the rail privatisation proposals the paper presents each 
theme in the context of the proposals. In conclusion, we highlight a number of future 
issues which will require monitoring and research in the future. In particular, we 
identify a number of hypotheses, put forward by both those in favour and against the 
Government's proposals, that should be tested. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In July 1992, the British Government published a White Paper, niew Opportunities 
for the Railways'. This outlined the government's proposals for the privatisation of 
and introduction of competition into British Rail (BR). Over a year later and after 
considerable discussion the Railways Act (1993) has been enacted and took effect from 
the 1st April, 1994. 
The Railways Act (1993) can be viewed as the culmination of government policy, 
which during the past 10-15 years has sought to reduce its subsidy payments to BR 
through improvements in productive efficiency and placing emphasis on 
commercialisation within the BR organisation. 
- 
This policy resulted in a total reorganisation of BR from a regional basis to a sector 
basis. From 1962 to 1982 BR was organised on a regional basis, with each region 
responsible for a variety of services. Some services that exhibited economies of scale, 
such as procurement and finance, were centralised. This organisational structure 
made allocating responsibility for revenue, subsidy and costs a very imprecise process. 
There was also a separation of the commercial and the operating roles of 
management, right up to the Chief Executive level. 
In an aim to improve the accountability of services, and managers, BR was 
reorganised into five sectors, Intercity, Regional Railways, Network Southeast, Freight 
and Parcels (see Castles, 1993). Staff and assets were made sector specific, although 
operations were still carried out by the operating department. The two main 
advantages of this organisation (see Preston and Nash, 1993) were (i) it made possible 
the defdtion of much clearer lines of managerial control and (ii) every manager had 
much tighter control over assets and so increased accountability for both his own and 
his sector's performance. 
This policy, coupled with government cuts in subsidy throughout the eighties, has 
resulted in an impressive improvement in both BR's productive and commercial 
performance, as  illustrated by Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: BR Performance 1979-1991192 (1991192 prices) 
Source: British Railways Board, Annual Reports and Accounts 
Total Grant (Em) 
Pass. Route Miles 
Pass. Miles (millions) 
Fare per passenger 
mile 
Passenger Stations 
Passenger Train Miles 
(millions) 
Train Miles per Member 
of Staff 
- 
1979 
1,237 
8,955 
19,000 
9.14 
2,365 
196 
1,521 
1983 
1,430 
8,932 
18,350 
9.69 
2,363 
203 
1,686 
1989190 
705 
8,897 
20,908 
10.81 
2,483 
225 
2,043 
1991192 
1,035 
8,880 
19,920 
10.51 
2,473 
231.3 
1,996 
Without wishing to dwell on Table 1.1, it can be seen that BR has succeeded in 
significantly reducing its total granvsubsidy throughout the eighties with only a 
slight reduction in the passenger network. The main reason for BR's improvement 
in performance is rooted in staff productivity, which grew by 34% between 1979 and 
1989190. The start of the recession in 199011 and the iacreased concern over safety 
reduced the gains achieved, but the overall performance was still impressive. 
Proponents of privatisation felt such an improvement gave an indication of 
potentially larger productivity gains from the full scale privatisation of BR. 
This opinion was reflected by the government, who felt that BR could improve both 
productivity and financial performance. It  ultimately envisaged BR, or a large part 
of BR, surviving on no subsidy and making a commercial rate of return on its assets, 
see Foster (1994). This, together with two new European Commission directive 911440 
and Council Regulation No 1893191, 
(1) Member states must establish separate accounts for infrastructure and for 
train operations. 
(2) Operating companies providing international rail passenger transport are to 
have transit rights over Member States railway networks by the 1st January, 
1993. 
has been the stimulus for the Railways Act 1993. 
2. THE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE RAILWAYS ACT 1993 
This section presents firstly, a general overview of the proposals and then concentrate 
on the roles to be played by Railtrack, the Franchisees, the Franchise Authority and 
the Regulator. 
2.1 A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Rather than privatise BR as a vertically integrated company, the government has 
split BR into two parts, infrastructure and operations. The provision and operation 
of rail infrastructure (track, signalling etc ...I becoming the responsibility of Railtrack. 
Initially, Railtrack will remain in the public sector, but is still expected to act as  a 
commercial organisation, recovering its full costs and earning a rate of return (5.6% 
initially, but eventually 8%) from charges it levies on operators. It is envisaged that 
Railtrack will eventually be privatised. Railtrack's other responsibilities will include 
arranging the maintenance of the infrastructure, monitoring of on track safety and 
the timetabling of all services across the network. 
By creating Railtrack the government has retained the infrastructure as a natural 
monopoly and eradicated the 'sunk cost' element it would otherwise represent for new 
entrants into the rail market. The government sees this reduction in an entrant's 
'sunk costs' as  a vital ingredient for allowing competition on the railways. Entrants' 
'sunk costs' will be reduced even further with the creation of Rolling Stock companies 
(ROSCOs), that will offer a range of rolling stock for operators to lease. 
On the operating side, both the Freight and Parcels divisions will be sold outright. 
Trainload Freight and Railfreight Distribution's Contract Services division will be 
formed into three new competing companies organised along geographical lines based 
around a North East, South East and West/Swtland division. Each division will have 
access to its own maintenance depots and rolling stock, and will not be local 
monopolies. The divisions will have to negotiate with Railtrack for 'paths' and will 
immediately face 'open access' from other freight hauliers. 
Railfreight Distribution's European business will be managed through the start-up 
phase by BR and privatised as  soon as possible, once the key Channel Tunnel freight 
services are established. The govenunent is also inviting proposals from the private 
sector to participate in the Freightliner network (existing losses prohibit outright 
privatisation). The Parcels sector will be privatised as two separate parts, Red Star 
and Rail Express Systems (an attempt to sell Red Star has already failed). 
Looking a t  the passenger side 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) have been 
created, reflecting the number of profit centres that existed under BR (see appendix 
one for a list of TOCS and their main characteristics). These TOCs will eventually be 
franchised out to ~ r i v a t e  com~anies. At the moment the TOCs are trading, within the 
remnants of BR, i s  Train Oierating Units CTOUs), however I will only ;ie the term 
TOCs through the rest of this working paper. The Office of Passenger Rail 
Franchising (OPRAF) will set minimum standards in terms of frequency, reliability 
and overcrowding and stipulate maximum fares. It will also want to be satisfied that 
potential franchisees meet all the safety criteria that presently exist. For some 
Intercity routes, franchisees will be expected to pay for their franchises, whilst on 
loss-making routes the 'lowest subsidy offered' will be the criterion. However, the 
latest set of infrastructure charges published by Railtrack make all routes loss-making 
(with the possible exception of Gatwick). Any franchise not let will continue to be 
operated by the British Railways Board (BRB). 
OPRAF will then have to negotiate a contract with Railtrack, for paths and the 
appropriate charges for the new franchisees. From April (1994) the TOCs will operate 
as independent subsidiaries of BR. By the end of 1995 the first franchises will come 
into existence. Rather than franchise the whole network together, the government 
has earmarked six 'shadow franchises' to form the first wave of franchises. These 
comprise: 'Gatwick Express', 'London, Tilbury and Southend', 'South Western', 
'Scotrail', 'East Coast Mainline' and the 'Great Western'. The new railway system will 
also incorporate an 'open access' policy. This will allow other operators (possibly other 
franchisees) to operate services on any section of the network, providing they satisfy 
all the regulations set down by the Regulator (including safety) and have negotiated 
'access contracts' with Railtrack. However, it is envisaged that 'open access' will be 
delayed for two years to allow rail franchisees to overcome initial stumbling blocks, 
a so-called 'honeymoon period'. 
The final player in the government's Railways Act 1993 is the Regulator, whose role 
we will cover in more depth later in section 2.5. 
2.2 RAILTRACK 
From April 1994 Railtrack assumed responsibility for Britain's rail infrastructure. 
Railtrack itself sees its role as, 
* supplying track access to train operators, managing time-tabling and 
signalling, and ensuring that the infrastmcture is maintained and improved 
to meet the needs of train companies. 
* maintaining and improving the industry's safety performance. 
* charging for track access to meet the costs of infrastructure maintenance and 
improvements, and seeking new sources of investment for infrastructure 
improvements. 
* leasing stations and depots to operators or, in some cases, to independent 
station managers. 
Y acting commercially, ensuring the needs of customers are met and that charges 
are structured to encourage use of track. 
* establishing clear contracts that set out Railtrack's duties to its customers and 
the standards to be met by operators and contractors. 
* 
'buying in' maintenance from infrastructure companies formed from within BR. 
(Source: Railtrack, "A Guide To The Organisation", 1993) 
Railtrack is organised around ten geographical zones, who work closely with the head 
off~ce team in planning and implementing Railtrack's policies and strategies. As 
4 
previously stated the main responsibility of Railtrack is to operate and maintain the 
infrastructure and operations control of the former BR network. 
All maintenance work has initially been contracted out to the newly formed 
Infrastructure Companies (ISCOs). There are be fourteen ISCOs, constituted out of 
the engineers and management who currently maintain BR's track and signals. Their 
geographical spread ensure that each Railtrack zone has a choice o r  several 
contractors. Eventually the ISCOs will be privatised (target date of April 1996) and 
all maintenance work competed for. The government hopes the resultant competition 
will provide both efficiency gains and quality improvements. The maintenance 
contracts are worth E l  billion per year so the incentives to enter the market are quite 
substantial for private firms. The government sees this area as ripe for substantial 
cost-savings. However, Railtrack has made it quite clear that safety will not be 
sacrificed in this area, with contracts being clearly specified and monitoring of work 
in effect. 
Railtrack will supply track access to franchisees via contracts negotiated with the 
Franchise Authority. The contracts will define in detail Railtrack's responsibilities 
to its customers and the customers responsibilities to Railtrack. Contracts will 
include details of 'paths' and the charges for them. 
Railtrack is a government owned plc and as such is a commercial organisation. The 
government has made it clear that it expects Railtrack to cover its costs and earn a 
rate of return. 
"Railtrack will be required to cover its costs. It will wish to invest t o  replace 
assets and improve the quality of service to customers. Investment 
expenditure including a rate of return and other costs will therefore need to be 
reflected in charges for the use of infrastructure ..." 
(Department of Transport, "Gaining Access", para.2.3, 1993) 
On track charges the 'Gaining Access' document said, 
"Access charges for the first franchises across the network will be set by 
Railtrack taking into account all the costs associated with providing the 
facilities and services to support the franchise. The level will be determined 
after taking into account the contributions to common costs which Railtrack 
expects to receive from freight and non-franchised passenger operators. 
Charges will comprise of a fixed charge and a variable, usage-related 
component. The fmed component will cover those fixed costs which are directly 
attributable to the operator and an allocation of common costs. The variable 
component will relate to avoidable costs directly associated with the frequency 
and timing of service." (paragraph 6.9) 
The exact workings of the charges can be found in 'Railtrack Access Charging 
Principles and Procedures' o?ebruary 1994). They can be broken down into a variable 
component, a wed cost component and a stations component. 
The variable component will comprise of, 
(i) Traction Current: This is directly variable with the type of electric 
stock run, the nature of the route it runs over and the mileage 
performed. 
(ii) Track Usage: This encompasses those elements of track maintenance 
which vary with volume and speed - and by no means all do - together 
with a measure of the extent to which track life is reduced as traffic 
levels increase - sometimes referred to as the effect on renewals 
periodicity. This is based on the BR model MARPAS (see Dodgson, 
1994). 
The fized cost component are allocated to specific operators using 'long-run avoidable 
costs'. In cases where such costs are common or joint, Railtrack sets out the following 
charging principles, 
"Having accounted for any contributions to common costs which the market 
position of certain Non-Franchised traffics might permit, the rule has been that 
the balance of common costs must be exhausted by allocative means between 
relevant Franchising Passenger TOUs." 
(Railtrack, 1994) 
The stations component refers to Railtrack's costs of ownership of the station 
structures, whether franchised or not. 
Beside track charges, Railtrack will levy four other charges. 
(a) Independent Station's (ISO) Station Operator Access 
(b) Station Leases 
(c) Depot Leases 
(d) Other ChargedAdjustments: for example Performance Payments that reflect 
Railtrack's contribution to levels of reliability and punctuality achieved (similar 
to AMTFtAK's payments to freight operato& in the USA). 
i 
The net effect of the new rail charges is to increase costs overall. In the government's 
view this is because, 
"...there are now more costs classified as marginal costs and fewer as 
overheads or common costs, and also because the Government is now requiring 
a return of 5.6% on all assets." 
(Foster, 1994) 
However, increasing the number of costs classified as marginal costs affects the 
allocation of costs not the total amount of costs. Foster's statement also fails t o  
recognise the role played by Modern Equivalent Asset Value (MEAV) in the cost 
equation. The key issue as regards cost increases is the valuation of Railtrack's 
assets. The treasury has valued them at £6.5 billion, up to £4 billion higher than 
Robert Horton (Railtrack's chairman) had sought, arguing that many of the assets 
were so dilapidated as to represent liabilities (Local Transport Today (LTT), 17th 
March, 1994). 
In the government view this will give the correct cost signals and be a true reflection 
of infrastructure costs. Table 2.1 contains Railtrack's projected track access charges 
for 1994/95. For Intercity services the charges represent a significant amount of 
projected revenue, 75% in the case of the East Coast, 66% in the case of the West 
Coast and 83% for Anglia. 
Table 2.1: Projected Track Access Charges 
Source: Railtrack 
Given that these are only track charges, one must ask whether or not potential 
franchisees will actual pay for these Intercity franchises (with the exception of 
Gatwick)? 
Railtrack Estimated 
Charges 
94/95 
172.0 
173.0 
28.0 
105.0 
43.0 
121.0 
8.0 
56.0 
68.0 
43.0 
37.0 
23.0 
127.0 
40.0 
179.0 
109.0 
171.0 
178.0 
170.0 
135.0 
121.0 
38.0 
52.0 
22.0 
INTERCITY 
East Coast 
West Coast 
Anglia 
Cross Country I 
1 
Midland 1 
Great Western 
Gatwick 
NETWORK SE 
North 
Great Eastern 
Thameslink 
Thames I 
1 
Chiltern } 
WAGN 
LT&S 
South Eastern 
South Central 
South Western 
REGIONAL 
Scotrail 
North East 
Central 
North West I 
1 
Mersey Rail 1 
S.Wales & West] 
1 
Cardiff Valleys 1 
In all cases only traffic that can cover Railtrack's charges will be given access. The 
exception to this will be freight traffic for which wider benefits are obtained by 
switching from road to rail. This is covered by the new Track Charges Grant Scheme, 
under which: 
Passenger Income 
91/92 
209.0 
239.2 
30.7 
167.3 
158.9 
24.6 
50.6 
100.3 
50.3 
43.5 
94.6 
56.3 
205.0 
151.1 
230.3 
81.6 
48.6 
67.9 
65.1 
39.6 
94/95 
230.0 
263.2 
33.8 
184.1 
174.8 
27.0 
55.7 
110.4 
55.4 
47.8 
104.1 
61.9 
225.6 
166.3 
253.4 
89.8 
53.8 
74.7 
71.6 
43.6 
"Grants would be paid under a contract between the Government and the 
operator. Revenue grant of up to 100% of the charge negotiated with Railtrack 
would be available, where this is necessary t o  retain or attract traffic to rail 
and justified in terms of the wider benefits obtained." 
(Gaining Access, para. 4.7, 1993) - 
As well as maintaining and operating the rail network, Railtrack is expected t o  invest 
in new infrastructure. Funds for investment are meant to come from track charges 
and from 'other sources'. These 'other sources' may be interpreted as joint projects 
involving TOClFranchisees or other private sector sources, the National Loans Fund 
and government grants for socially desirable infrastructure schemes. At this stage 
the definition is very loose. 
Within Railtrack a Property Directorate has been set up that is responsible for the 
Railtrack property portfolio including stations, operational land, arches under railway 
lines, and railway buildings. The property directorate will devise schemes for the 
management of 'independent stations' and for the access arrangements and duties of 
train operators leasing stations. Great emphasis is being placed, by the government, 
on the development of stations by the private sector (not necessarily rail operators). 
The two other main roles of Railtrack are in safety and timetabling. Both roles are 
seen as essential to ensure passengers' well being in terms of health and network 
benefits. Railtrack is assisted in developing safety policy and strategy by the Health 
and Safety Executive. Given the recent spate of accidents, such as Clapham Junction, 
this role is seen as one of major importance. Similarly, timetabling, train planning 
and signalling are key roles for Railtrack. Not only are they necessary to ensure 
passenger safety; they also help preserve network benefits for passengers, for example 
minimising interchange time on through journeys. 
The final point regarding Rgiltrack is its long term future. At the moment it is 
operating as a public sector plc, however the government hopes to privatise the 
organisation as a whole. It has also stated that in exceptional circumstances it will 
allow franchisees to be vertically integrated e.g. Isle of Wight. 
2.3 FRANCHESEES 
The franchisees will eventually take over the passenger operating side of BR. 
Franchise agreements will be specified by OPRAF in terms of services to be provided, 
their reliability and in some cases maximum fares. The system of franchises will 
initially be based upon the present timetable and departureslchanges will only be 
allowed where the Franchising Director judges it in the passengers' interest. The 
fmal say will still rest with the Regulator who is the only person authorised to issue 
operating licences. It is his statutory duty to promote competition and to protect the 
interests of users, ensuring that train operators are treated fairly by infrastructure 
owners. 
The Franchise Authority will negotiate with Railtrack for the paths necessary to run 
the Franchises (Access Agreements). However this will only apply to the first 
generation of franchises, after that Railtrack will be under no obligation to provide 
paths required for the Franchise Director. This opens up the paths for 'open access', 
who may bid more than the Franchising Director. The government has promised 
suff~cient resources t o  continue t o  fund socially necessary services via the Franchise 
Director. 
Included in the Access Agreements with Railtrack will be access to stations and 
depots. Franchisees will be able to lease rolling stock from one of the three ROSCOs 
that are to be formed. The ROSCOs will take over some workshops to repair and refit 
their rolling stock, whilst Franchisee's will operate smaller workshops to carry out 
minor running repairs on rollig stock. However, any major repairs and refits will be 
carried out by the three Train Engineering Service Companies (TESCOs). The creation 
of ROSCOs, like the creation of Railtrack, has been designed to reduce the 'sunk cost' 
element facing potential franchisees and open up passenger services t o  competition. 
The government also envisages efficiency gains from competing ROSCOs, which will 
complement higher utilisation of rolling stock by Franchisees. Besides leasing former 
BR stock, Franchisees will be required to take on existing BR staff. The government 
hopes this will allow 'new working practices' to be introduced into the railway 
industry and stimulate increased labour productivity. BR employees work the highest 
mean hours per annum of any western european rail worker and earn the third lowest 
hourly pay rate of any western european rail worker (see Preston && 1994). 
The government has given a central role to Franchisees in the Railways Act (1993). 
It sees competition 40 supply' resulting in more dynamic and efficient provision of rail 
services. Whether this view can be substantiated will be looked at  in section 3.3 of 
this working paper. 
2.4 THE FRANCEUSE AUTHORITY - OFFICE OF PASSENGER RAILWAY 
FRANCHISING (OPRAF) 
Section five of the Railways Act (1993) sets out the general duties of the Franchising 
Director. The role of the Director is, 
"(a) to fulfil, in accordance with such instructions and guidance as may be 
given to him from time t o  time by the Secretary of State, any objectives given 
to him from time t o  time by the Secretary of State with respect to- 
(i) the provision of services for the carriage of passengers by railway in Great 
Britain, or 
(ii) the operation of additional railway assets under or by virtue of any 
franchise agreement or any provision of sections 30 and 37 to 49 below. 
(b) to ensure that any payment to which this paragraph applies are such as he 
reasonably considers will achieve economically and efficiently any objectives 
given to him by the Secretary of State" 
(Section 5 (1) of the Railways Act 1993) 
The payments which paragraph (b) refers to are, 
"(a) any payments which the Franchising Director may be required to make 
pursuant to a franchise agreement; 
(b) any payments which the Franchising Director may make with a view to 
securing- 
(i) the provision of services, or 
(ii) the operation of any network, station or light maintenance depot, or any 
part of a network, station or light maintenance depot." 
(Section 5 (2) of the Railways Act 1993) 
It is clear from the Railways Act (1993) that the responsibility for the provision of 
passenger rail services, as set by the Secretary of State, rests with the Franchise 
Director. At the moment the services he has to provide are those that are presently - 
provided by BR. As should be clear by now, the Director. will provide those services 
through a network of 25 franchises that will be let by a process of competitive bidding. 
In most cases he will be accepting the lowest subsidy bid and it is this subkidy 
payment that is referred to in paragraph (b) of section 5 (1). 
Two other points can be highlighted. Throughout subsection (1) of section 5 of the 
Railways Act, constant reference is made to 'objectives of the Secretary of State'. This 
makes clear the function of the Franchising Director as  an agent of the Secretary of 
State and also sets up the potential for conflict between the Secretary of State and the 
Regulator, if the two have different objectives. 
The second point that can be highlighted is the role of the PTEs. Sections 32-36 of 
the Railways Act (1993) also allows Passenger Transport Authorities and Executives 
(PTAs and PTEs) to secure provision of train services for their areas as  part of a 
Franchise agreement, in conjunction with the Franchise Director. 
2.5 OFFICE OF TEE RAIL REGULATOR - ORR I 
The general duties of the Regulator are outlined in section four of the Railways A d  
1993. His role will cover all activities of railways in Great Britain and will involve 
discussion with Railtrack, TOCslFranchisees, Private Freight Operators, Private 
Parcel Operators, Open Access Operators and the Franchise Director. His roles are 
a s  follows, 
(i) Competition and Fair Access - The Regulator will have to ensure that 
Railtrack does not abuse its monopoly position and does not discriminate 
between different franchise and 'open access' operators (see Nash, 1993). As 
such all access agreements will be subject to approval by the regulator. If he 
finds any agreements unacceptable he can ask for them to be modified. The 
regulator will also monitor the quality of Railtrack's service to operators and 
take appropriate action if he feels i t  fails to meet the criteria in the access 
agreement. 
(ii) Rail Operators - Licences that allow rail operators to operate are issued by 
the Regulator. Before issuing such licenses he will have to be satisfied that the 
operators are 'safety validated' and properly insured. He will also impose 
'through ticketing' on operators as a social obligation. Other 'social obligations' 
include concern for the environment and the interests of disabled passengers. 
Quite how the Regulator will interpret these is still not known (although with 
freight, the environment will be covered by the new Track Charges Grant 
Scheme). 
(iii) Closure - Closure procedures are set out in sections 37 to 50 of the Railways 
Act 1993. Any closure proposal will first of all be brought to the attention of 
the Franchise Director who in turn will notify the Regulator. The Regulator 
will then decide if a closure can occur and may attach conditions to the closure. 
In the event of closure any aggrieved parties may appeal to the Secretary of 
State. The major change is that there is no longer the constraint to operate 
services that are 'broadly comparable' with those that existed in 1975. 
(iv) Users Interests - paragraph (a) of subsection (1) in section 4 of the Railways 
Act states that part of the regulator's duties is, 'to protect the interests of users 
of railway services'. The main voice for users in the new rail set up are the 
Rail Users Consultative Committees. These will succeed the current Transport 
Users Consultative Committees and will report directly to the Regulator. The 
new committee will still have no powers of its own, but its reports will go to the 
Regulator who has considerable power and a remit to take notice of such 
reports. This is an improvement on the current situation where the 
committees are more of a pressure group rather than an integral part of the 
policy making body. 
(v) General Duties - The a d  places great emphasis on the Regulator always 
promoting 'efflcien and economy on the part of persons providing railway 
services', on developing the 'rail network to the greatest extent that he 
considers economically practicable' and 'to enable persons providing railway 
services to plan the future of their businesses with a reasonable degree of 
assurance'. One would therefore expect the Regulator to promote 'open access' 
to the greatest possible extent, while maintaining a broadly homogenous degree 
of service provision. 
(vi) Secretary of State - Until December 31 1996, the regulator must take into 
account any guidance given t o  him by the Secretary of State. This is designed 
to overcome any initial 'teething troubles', in particular as  regards 'open 
access'. 
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3. THE ECONOMICS BEHIND RAIL PRIVATISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews the economics behind rail privatisation, especially the material 
that has appeared in the last couple of years. A review of the latest literature led to 
the identification of four major themes, (1) Contestability and Barriers to Entry, (2) 
Franchising and Open Access, (3) Vertical Integration, (4) Horizontal Integration. 
Each of these themes are now examined in greater detail. 
3.2 Contestability and Barriers to Entry  
3.2.1 Literature Review 
One of the central aims of the privatisation proposals, contained in the Railways Act 
1993, was to open up the rail market to competition, to make it contestable. It sees 
competition as the mechanism through which will come efficiency gains, cost/subsidy 
reductions, innovation and improvements in service quality. So how contestable will 
the privatisation proposals make the rail market? 
The theory of contestable markets was put forward by Baumol(1982) and Baumol et 
a1 (1986). Since its appearance the theory has been used as a yardstick to judge the 
contestability of various industries and was a central tenet in David Starkie's 
proposals (1984) that the Railways A d  1993 has embraced. The theory promulgates 
that the 'threat of entry' into a market results in incumbent firms behaving in an 
efficient manner. It is this concept that the rest of this section concentrates upon. 
The theory of contestable markets maintains that it is possible to obtain the benefits 
of competition without large numbers of competing firms. As Dodgson (1993a) 
acknowledges, 
"If an industry can be made perfectly contestable then the mere threat of competition 
will encourage existing firms to 'behave' e.g. price a t  average cost, ensuring costs are 
minimised for the output produced and (as long as the industry is not a natural 
monopoly) setting prices equal to marginal cost too." 
Even in the case of a natural monopoly the adoption of a break even constraint in a 
contestable market, through the adoption of Ramsey optimal prices and output, will 
lead to a pricing regime of less than average cost for some elastic goods and higher 
than average cost for other, elastic goods. For this to be sustainable requires sub- 
additivity of costs. The crux of the theory is that potential competition will lead to the 
same, if not better, results than those procured through actual competition. 
For a market to be perfectly contestable three key assumptions have to be fulfilled, 
(1) The entrants and the incumbent must be symmetrically placed, in that they 
are subject to the same regulations, possess similar market knowledge, have 
access to the same technology and produce output at  the same cost and that 
is perceived of being the same quality. 
(2) There must be an absence of 'sunk costs', so entry and exit into a market is 
costless e.g. any assets accumulated can either be used for the production of 
other goods or their value recouped in second-hand markets. 
(3) 'Hit and run' entry must be possible. That is to say either consumers reaction 
times to price differences must be quicker than the incumbents, or it is possible 
for entrants to enter into secret supply contract negotiations with consumers 
t o  secure a period of profitable entry. 
If all three conditions are fulfilled then any transient profit opportunities needn't be 
neglected by possible entrants. They can enter the market, exploit the profit 
opportunity and leave the market before the incumbent has had time to react. The 
result is that the incumbent is constrained to set price equal to average cost if he/she 
prices above average cost then helshe faces entry from potential entrants (although, 
as  noted above a multi-product monopolist facing economies of scope will be the one 
exception to this). Thus, according to Brewer (19941, producing allocative efficiency, 
X-efficiency and normal profits. The assumption also holds for a multi-product 
producer experiencing economies of scope. 
The central theme of the Railways Act 1993, has been to make railway operations 
contestable via 'franchises' and 'open access'. How closely does the privatisation 
developments, contained in the Railways Act 1993, mirror the assumptions of 
contestable market theory? To aid this analysis each assumption is looked a t  in turn. 
The first assumption specifies that both the entrants and the incumbent must face 
similar costs, similar regulation and have access to the same technology and produce 
an output of similar perceivable quality. The creation of Railtrack, ROSCOs and 
TESCOs, and the promise of equality in charges and accesslservice would suggest that 
potential franchise bidders and 'open access' operators will face similar costs (in a 
given franchise area). Discrepancies in costs could possibly occur for the leasing and 
maintenance of rolling stock if the larger franchises were able to obtain discounts 
from the ROSCOs and TESCOs. This might effect the relative competitiveness of 
'open access' operators or the equality of bids for franchise renewal. 
The creation of ROSCOs and TESCOs has meant that, initially, potential rail 
operators have access to the same technology. Again this may change over time 
depending upon whether franchisees and 'open access' operators decide to invest in 
rolling stock that is technologically superior to that offered by ROSCOs or in their 
own depots, as was the case with BK-Tag in Sweden (section 3.7, ITS Working Paper 
420). However, in the short term this is unlikely to be the case but the potential is 
still there. 
A further imbalance between incumbent and entrants is likely to originate from the 
knowledge of the market each possesses. The incumbent will possess information on 
passenger demand and flows, price elasticities and the effect of service changes. Such 
information will not be available to potential 'open access' entrants and will reduce 
their ability to set fares and services a t  optimum levels for their entry into the 
market. 
The second assumption specifies that there must be an absence of 'sunk costs' t o  
facilitate costless entry. The privatisation proposals for BR separates infrastructure 
from operations, thus eradicating the major element of sunk costs inherent in railway 
operations. The creation of ROSCOs and TESCOs has also considerably reduced the 
'sunk costs' facing a potential entrant, and so the cost of entry and exit into rail 
operations. Potential entrants are able to lease rolling stock from ROSCOs and can 
contract out any major maintenance work to TESCOs depots, all without any capital 
investment that might constitute 'sunk costs'. A further 'sunk cost', that of terminals, 
has also been removed with ownership passing to either Railtrack or Independent 
Station operators. At first glance then it would appear the privatisation proposals 
have reduced, by a considerable degree, the element of 'sunk costs' that a potential 
rail operator might incur. However, there may still be some 'sunk costs' in the form 
of recruitment and training of staff. Further 'sunk costs' may also be incurred due to 
marketing activities, which with an established brand name may be very substantial. 
Regulation of the rail industry will be carried out by the Office of the Rail Regulator 
(headed by John Swift QC). Again the government have gone to great lengths to 
stress the impartiality of the regulator and his role in ensuring fair and equal 
treatment for all franchises and 'open access' operators as regards track charges and 
track access. Whether some kind of regulatory capture occurs only time will tell, but 
initially it would be fair to presume that all potential rail operators would face similar 
regulation. 
The privatisation proposals once again appear to satisfy another condition for 
contestable markets. The third condition specifies that 'hit and run' entry must be 
possible, and it is here that the privatisation proposals look prone to failure. Take the 
example of an 'open access' operator who wishes to compete with an incumbent 
franchisee. 'Hit and run entry' relies upon the incumbent being unable to respond 
quickly to entry by either reducing price andfor output. However, the privatisation 
proposals are such a s  to give advance warning of any potential 'open access' entry 
into the rail market. An 'open access' operator must recruit rail staff, negotiate with 
the ROSCOs and TESCOs and satisfy the Regulator that they comply to all the safety 
requirements governing rail operations, all before helshe begins rail operations. Such 
activity is very likely to alert any incumbent franchisee or 'open access' operator to 
the possibility of another entrant, allowing them to respond even before entry occurs. 
Even if this pre-entry activity fails to alert incumbents to the potential entry the 
entrant's negotiations with Railtrack surely will. One of Railtrack's responsibilities 
is to produce a national timetable and ensure the survival of network benefits for 
passengers. The timetable will be changed twice per year and any new services will 
have to be discussed with the incumbent operators to ensure the national timetable 
and network benefits are maintained. Not only will this forewarn incumbents of 
entry, but it will also limit the opportunities for entryhew services. This 
interpretation must be viewed with care, since the lack of opportunity to change 
service may negate the incumbents' ability to respond to entry by changing their own 
service levels, but not their price and service quality. This suggests that where 
competition occurs it will, at least initially, do so in the price and service quality 
dimensions only. An exception to this rule has been identified by Nash and Preston 
(1992). They suggest that the trainload freight market which is dominated by a few 
very large customers may be susceptible to 'hit and run' entry through the negotiation 
of secret contracts with these customers. However, even this may be pre-empted by 
the adoption of a 'never knowingly undersold' policy by the incumbent. 
A further weakness in the privatisation proposals is that both freight and passenger 
services exhibit economies of scale and density. Preston (19941, found that in terms 
of economies of scale with respect to operating costs, the smallest western european , 
rail operators exhibit increasing returns, the medium western european rail operators 
exhibit constant returns and the largest western european rail operators decreasing 
returns. In terms of returns to density, all railways exhibit increasing returns, with 
the exception of the most heavily used systems. He concludes that to  minimise costs 
calls for a network of 4,000 km operating around 120,000 million train kms per 
annum. It seems highly unlikely that any 'open access' operator would be capable of, 
or desire, entry at  such a level, unless such an operator was an existing franchisee. 
In any event the proposed rail franchises would be unable to support two operators 
of that size. Despite this evidence there is still the prospect of entry by 'open access' 
operators into niche markets such as 1st class travel, where minimum costs are not 
as important as the quality of service. Furthermore, studies carried out by Caves et 
a1 (1980) and McGeehan (1993) have listed the only economies existing as being those 
of density associated with infrastructure, not rail operations. 
Finally the existence of 'sunk costs' in the form of recruitment and training, and 
possibly rolling stock also add to the cost of Bit and run' entry. 
Already it can be seen that the privatisation proposals do not result in the creation 
of a perfectly contestable market for rail. This is before possible strategic and 
innocent barriers to entry have been considered. Dodgson (1993a), Nash and Preston 
(1992) and Brewer (1994) look at  a variety of innocent, strategic and predatory 
barriers to entry. The existence of innocent barriers to entry make any market less 
contestable and give rise to strategic and predatory barriers. 
Innocent barriers take several forms in the rail industry, the largest being economies 
of experience e.g. management and staff knowledge and training. The first wave of 
franchises will take on a large of number of BR staff and in the process will obtain 
such economies. These will be reinforced, during their 'honeymoon period', for when 
'open access' operators enter the fray. Such economies will also give a distinct 
advantage to the incumbent franchisee and to Management Employee Buy Outs 
(MEBO) during the 'renewal stage'. The franchisee is likely to be larger than any 
'open access' operator and have easier access to capital and face a weaker bankrupt 
constraint. Brand image and loyalty can also act as innocent barriers to entry. 
The existence of these innocent barriers gives rise t o  strategic and predatory barriers 
to entry. The former are carried out before entry takes place and are normally in the 
form of pricdservice matching promises. This could result in franchises matching 
'open access' operators prices or each others in areas where they compete directly e.g. 
Edinburgh to Glasgow. Some of the strategic barriers that occurred in the 
deregulated air, coach and bus market, such as 'denying access t o  terminals and 
depots', will be unlikely to occur given the independence of termini and depots. Other 
barriers derived from the ownership of travel agents, computerised reservation 
systems and ticket counters may exist and should be monitored for. Service matching 
might be harder t o  accomplish for timetabling reasons as  outlined earlier. 
Predatory barriers can take the form of unsustainable fare cuts just before entry and 
during the entry of a new operator. The success of such barriers will depend upon the 
financial muscle of both operators and the characteristics of the operators service and 
the market segment that they are competing for. If the new entrant is aiming at  the 
1st class or commuter market, customers may be relatively price inelastic and have 
greater interest in service quality variables e.g. comfort, reliability and journey time. 
The existence and success of strategic and predatory barriers to entry, and indeed the 
'contestability of the rail market' depend to a great extent on the effectiveness of the 
Regulator. The problems facing the regulator take several forms. The first issue 
confronting the Regulator is that of distinguishingpredation from genuine competitive 
responses, (Dodgson and Katsoulacos, 1991). To be able to do this he needs reliable 
and realistic information on costs and revenues. Nash (1994) and Gylee (1993), feel 
the institutional complexities of the privatisation proposals and the presence of 
substantial joint costs will prevent him from achieving this. Nash (1994) also feels 
the Regulator will have a clash of interests with the Franchise Director on the subject 
of 'contestability'. The Regulator is meant to encourage competition from 'open access' 
operators, but if such operators succeed in 'cream skimming' from a franchisee's 
operations, then a franchisee's subsidy requirement from the franchise director will 
rise significantly if it is to continue to provide a network of services as defined in the 
franchise. It is not in the Franchise Director's, and possibly the Treasury's, interest 
to allow competition with franchisees, especially if it was felt such competition was 
not being charged fully for 'rail access'. The latter point could occur in the short run 
if Railtrack has spare capacity on its lines and is willing to recover only part of its 
fmed costs along with its variable costs. Baumol's Efficient Component Pricing Rule 
could be applied in this case (Baumol, 1983), that is the difference between the 
revenue earned by the existing operator and their out of pocket costs of running a 
train in a comparable slot. However, the information requirements for such a rule 
will not be precisely known to either Railtrack or the regulator. The rule also 
assumes that the prices in the before situation are set efficiently, creating further 
information problems. 
3.2.2 Summary: 
Despite some success in achieving the first two conditions for a contestable rail 
market the privatisation proposals appear to fall short of achieving the third 
condition, that of 'hit and run' entry. Moreover, the safeguard for ensuring 'hit and 
run' entry, namely the regulator would appear to be facing a difficult task in 
achieving this and maintaining the other two conditions. 
It is fair comment to conclude that the rail market under the privatisation proposals 
is not perfectly contestable in the Baumol sense. However, there would appear to be 
scope for competition in niche markets such as 1st class, where quality and reliability 
of service take priority over fare levels. 
3.3 Franchising 
3.3.1 Literature Review 
The second central tenet of the privatisation proposals contained in the Railways Act 
1993 is that of 'franchising'. Franchising was f ~ s t  suggested by Chadwick (1859) and 
resurrected by Demsetz (1968). It  is designed to overcome the situation where, due 
to economies of scale, scope and density, the least cost producer is one of natural 
monopoly. Two problems immediately arise with this situation, (1) a natural 
monopoly maybe 'productively efficient' but that doesn't guarantee it achieving 
'allocative efficienc (Domberger, 19861, (2) there is no guarantee that the natural 
monopoly is 'productively efficient' as it may still suffer from X-inefficiency and lack 
dynamic efficiency (Toner, 1993). In both these cases some form of regulation would 
appear to be the solution e.g. rate of return or RPI-x. However Demsetz would argue 
for an alternative, franchising. 
The concept behind franchising suggests that competition for the market can be a 
substitute for competition & the market. Firms' bid for the exclusive right to supply, 
with the firm offering the lowest price or highest payment (assuming no quality 
dimensions) awarded the franchise. The bidding process based on lowest price is 
known as the Chadwick/Demsetz auction and is designed to bring prices down to 
levels close to expected unit costs of production. Bidding based on highest payment 
is designed to reflect contestants expectations of the discounted stream of monopoly 
rents accruing to the operator over the life of the contract. This ensures that a large 
part of the future monopoly rents are appropriated by the franchising authority and 
that the most efficient producer is chosen (he can afford largest payment). However, 
as Domberger points out, this doesn't alleviate pricing inefficiencies associated with 
monopoly, hence the need for some element of price regulation. A similar view is held 
by Dnes (1993) who feels that in the case of rail franchising: 
"Auctioning to the lowest bidder of the subsidy required to run a loss-making route 
a t  best simply minimises the subsidy without paying attention to wider allocative 
issues .... The Government's proposals may confer small gains on travellers and could 
be much improved by the simultaneous application of price-capping." 
Franchise contracts themselves take two forms, 'owning franchises' and 'operating 
franchises'. Owning franchises require the franchisee to provide all the capital assets 
involved in the production of that good or service prescribed in the contract. Such 
capital investment constitute 'sunk costs' which prevent 'costless entry and exit'. With 
an  operating contract capital is provided by either the state or a public body. Whilst 
overcoming the problems associated with 'owning franchises', 'operating franchises' 
lead to inefficiencies in the deployment of assets which are not under the control of 
the operating agents who have the incentives to minimise costs (Preston and Nash, 
1993). 
Theoretically, franchising makes a market more contestable, improving both 
productive and allocative efficiency. It increases market contestability by allowing 
firms to bid for the 'rights to supply'before they have committed any resources to the 
attempted entry. Put another way, franchising reduces the 'sunk cost' element t o  
purely the costs of constructing the bid. In a capital intensive industry such 'sunk 
costs' may be substantial. Franchising also reduces the incumbents scope to employ 
predatory behaviourlreadion, since the new efficient entrant can take on the entire 
market immediately rather than gradually winning market share. The franchising 
mechanism will provide the regulator with information on the competitiveness of 
potential suppliers and reduce an incumbent's ability t o  mislead the regulator on cost 
issues. The threat of franchise termination should also serve to ensure satisfactory 
performance during the course of the franchise. 
Franchising is not without its problems but before commencing any examination of 
these it will be useful to look at  franchising in the context of the rail privatisation 
proposals. 
The previous section concluded that the proposals contained in the Railways Act 1993 
did not result in a perfectly contestable market as regards franchisees versus open 
access operators, and incumbent franchises versus potential franchises. Franchising 
is the second element in the government's quest for increased competition in the 
provision of rail services. Given economies of density surrounding rail operations (see 
Nash and Preston, 1993) it makes greater sense to promote competition for the 
market rather than in the market and thus secure such economies. The franchising 
proposals contained within the Railways Act 1993, would appear to recognize this (for 
the moment 'open access' shall be ignored). However, for franchising to operate 
successfully several pitfalls must be negotiated. 
3.3.2 Potential Problems 
Williamson (1976) was one of the earliest to point out the potential problems and 
downfalls of the franchise bidding process and the criticisms he made have remained 
relevant since, as is witnessed by the NERA (1992) study. What then are the 
potential pitfalls? 
(1) The Bidding Process 
It is essential that the bidding process is competitive. The number of bidders must 
be sufficiently large or dispersed to discourage collusion amongst the bidders. If 
collusion is possible then the expected lowest price bid rises. A recent survey in the 
Financial Times (21 July, 1993) was only able to identify 16 potential franchise 
bidders, the majority of which were local bus companies interested in operating local 
train services (hardly encouraging competition in public transport). This number will 
probably rise when more specific cost and revenue data becomes available from the 
shadow franchises, although the nature of the rail business may itself preclude a large 
number of bidders. Such a survey does serve to illustrate the point that the Regulator 
must guard against collusion and may face the danger of high subsidy bids for 
uncontested lines e.g. Scottish Television bid E2,000 in the recent television franchise 
auction. 
If the number of franchise bidders remains small and they bid against each other 
constantly then the danger of collusion will rise. Not only will the regulator have t o  
guard against collusion but also possible strategic behaviour on behalf of the 
incumbent franchisee. Such behaviour can result from asymmetry of information 
between the incumbent and the entrant. To help overcome this the contract must be 
speciFIed exactly, something the franchise director has already given assurances on. 
Another crucial element in the bidding process is the presence of sunk costs, the 
presence of which increase the penalty of entry and exit, thus creating an asymmet'ry 
at  the bidding stage. Williamson in particular recognises the sunk cost natufe of 
'human capital'. He classifies 'human capital' as sunk if the labour skills are hfghly 
specialised and specific to that market, and whether or not employees of the 
incumbent deal with potential entrants in a different manner. If the first condition 
is true then it will be, 
"...inefficient to displace, fully, the experienced labour and management group that is 
employed by the winner of the initial franchise." 
Regarding the second condition, Williamson conjectures that workers will treat the 
incumbent and entrant differently, due to 'informal understandings' with respect to 
job security, promotional expectations etc .... This doesn't mean that employee's will 
not negotiate with outsiders, but that such informal agreements will require more 
explicit formal agreements, so adding to the cost of an entrant's bid. The result 
according to Williamson is: 
"If the original winners of the bidding competition realise non-trivial advantages in 
information and informal organisational respects during the contract execution, 
bidding parity a t  the contract renewal interval can no longer be presumed." 
I t  would not be unreasonable to suggest that such 'human capital' exists within the 
rail industry. However, in the case of rail privatisation franchises, Williamson's point 
is made largely redundant, given that staff are automatically transferred to the 
winning franchise. Where it will be relevant is in the case of 'open access' operators. 
A problem may also arise in the form of an unsuccessful MEBO bid. The successful 
franchisee may obtain operations staff automatically but not necessarily the 
management staff. 
2) Contract Specification and Duration 
Several issues can be identified which are applicable to both contract specification and 
duration. If a contract can not be specified simply and comprehensively then the 
problem of evaluation imrnediateliarises. In the example given by Demsetz (1968), 
license plates, the product produced by the franchiser was standardised and the only 
criteria to judge was that of price. Other franchises, such as  terrestrial television, 
have a variety of pricdquality proposals to judge. This will be the case with the 
Railway franchises, where bidders are likely to offer various quality of service, various 
prices and to a lesser degree various service levels (services in addition to those 
specified by the franchise director). Despite the government indicating that franchises 
will be awarded mainly on a lowest subsidylhighest payment basis, these extra quality 
dimensions may well be taken into account. 
Tight specification can lead to execution problems during the franchise contract, see 
Williamson (1976). In an uncertain environment, where demand, costs. technology 
and supply conditions are likely to fluctuate then the chances of contract renegotiation 
will increase, especially if the franchise suffers from the 'winners curse' (the likelihood 
of which increases the greater the number of bids) and the contract period is long. 
Renegotiation will become a problem if the franchisee has information advantages 
over the franchise director. The franchisee can use his advantage to artificially inflate 
his costs. In most cases the franchiser is likely to succumb to renegotiation because 
(1) franchise agencies are loathe to concede error (2) the expense of another bidding 
round (3) problems of maintaining supply if the franchisee fails (although the 
existence of BRB forestalls this threat in the short term). 
Given the uncertain nature of the Railway business (demand fluctuates greatly with 
the economic cycle) renegotiation is highly probable, although this is likely to be off- 
set to an extent if contract length is long. 'Open access' might also add pressure for 
renegotiation. The government has already indicated that it will allow renegotiation 
of franchise contracts where the case merits it. If the government is a t  a 
disadvantage information wise, then there might be a real danger of franchise subsidy 
increasing rather than decreasing in the future. 
Conversely, lack of specification, in relation to quality variables and accounting 
procedures, can lead to execution problems. If punctuality, appearance and other such 
service variables are not well defmed then the franchise authority may find itself with 
a service far removed from the one it envisaged. Similarly, if accounting procedure 
is not monitored and controlled then it may be used by the franchisee in a 'strategic 
sense' when they renegotiate contracts. Although no rail franchise contracts have 
been produced, indications at this stage are that specification of quality and 
accounting procedure will be very detailed, with financial penalties for failure to 
comply. 
Preston and Nash (1993) identify the problem of contract specification and minimum 
efficient size. With 25 rail franchise contracts, it seems highly likely that some of 
them will fall below minimum efficient scale. The evidence for this is mixed, see 
section 3.5. 
The importance of specEcation within a franchise contract is matched by the duration 
of the contract. A trade-off can be ident%ed between short and long term contracts. 
Long term contracts give the franchisees an incentive to invest in capital and offers 
greater opportunity for realising positive profit streams throughout the franchise life. 
Domberger (1986) illustrates the point with a simple example and concludes that 
shorter contracts reduce the profit opportunities open to franchises and so reduce the 
number of bidders and the cometitive oubut. Such a conclusion is a generalisation 
given other factors effecting thefranchisee e.g. the asset specificity of t h i  contract and 
variability of the demand. However, long term contracts have their share of problems. 
Longer contracts increase the likelihood of incumbents benefiting from important 
information advantages and possibly 'sunk cost' advantages that reduce competition 
a t  the 'renewal stage'. Long term contracts lack the threat of non-renewal that is 
characteristic of short term contracts and will be subject to constant renegotiation 
through out the contract period. 
Short term contracts, according to Williamson (19861, 
"...facilitate adaptive, sequential decision making." 
They overcome the inflexibility of long term contracts. The constant 'renewal stage' 
acts as a discipline on the franchisee, leading to better performance and greater 
cooperation with the franchise authority. However, if the franchise is an 'owning 
franchise' a short term contract will give the franchise no overwhelming incentive to 
maintain its assets. 
What then would be the ideal length for a rail franchise contract? A short term 
contract would no doubt put pressure on rail franchisees to meet service and quality 
specifkations and should encourage them to reduce costs. It may also reduce the 
scope for strategic behaviour by the incumbent. However, a short term contract would 
not encourage investment by the rail franchisees themselves which may present 
problems for Railtrack who may look to rail franchises as a source of funds. The 
specialised nature of rail staff and operations may also make redundant the argument 
that short term contracts reduce the likliehood of incumbents benefiting from 
information and 'sunk cost' a t  the renewal stage. 
Table 3.1 taken from Nera (1992), illustrates the characteristics of recent world wide 
rail franchises, more specific details of which are examined in the summary. The 
length of rail franchises varies from one year, for the Swedish case, to 55 years for the 
Channel Tunnel. In the majority of cases the franchiser provides the long lived 
=specific assets, but only carries out major investment for short term contracts 
(Exception of the Swedish 15 yr case). In all the cases maintenance of rolling stock 
is carried out by the franchisee. The maintenance of the infrastructure 
is carried out by the franchisee, in the case of long contracts, and by the track owner, 
in the case of short term contracts (the exceptions to this pattern being Sweden and 
the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, MBTA). Another pattern to emerge from 
the Nera study is that of a reduction in contract specification the longer the contract 
and a tendency for contracts to take on a revenue, as opposed to a cost, format the 
longer the contract length. 
Table 3.1: Rail Franchise 
Minimal fares 
LRT = London Regional Ransport 
MBTA = Mmachoaetls Bay Transport Authority 
WRRA = Swlhern Califmia Regional Rail Authority 
MML = Manchegler Metdink 
Sou-: NERA (1992) 
3.3.3 Summary: 
Since its re-emergence in the late sixties, franchising has been tried in various 
industries classed as natural monopoly and their limitations and potentials have been 
widely observed. Without wishing to pre-empt this conclusion Fisher (1907) sums up 
the main difficulties associated with franchise contracts, 
"Regulation does not end with the formulation and adoption of a satisfactory contract, 
in itself a considerable task. If this were all, a few wise and honest men might, once 
in a generation supervise the framing of a franchise in proper form, and nothing 
further would be necessary." 
There is no standard franchise contract applicable to every industry, and in some 
cases industry may be better served by rate of returdRP1-x regulation. The greatest 
scope for franchising, where i t  can encourage efficiency the greatest, is when, 
(i) The produdservice can be simple and accurately specified and monitored. 
(ii) Technology is static, simple andlor non-specific. 
(iii) The environment is stable. 
(iv) Idiosyncratic skills are negligible. 
(v) Asset handover is easily accomplished. 
The UK rail franchise proposals break all five of these assumptions, so how successful 
is franchising likely to be? A further look at  the rail franchise case studies in the 
NERA study (1992) identifies that in all the cases their was little serious competition 
for the franchises. In Sweden only three firms competed for local service franchises, 
SJ (incumbent operator), BK-Tag and Linjebus (both bus companies). BK-Tag won 
two contracts, which have subsequently been lost to SJ. Both the MBTA and SCRRA 
have seen prospective franchises cut down to just two serious contenders in the form 
of Guilford Transportation Industries and Amtrack (MBTA) and Urban Transit 
Development Corporation and Amtrack (SCRRA), with Amtrack winning both 
contracts. In Argentina the majority of franchises have been contested by two 
consortiums with recent franchises attracting only one bidder. 
Argentina apart, all the contracts have been short term (3-5 yrs) and 'operating 
franchises'. Although the NERA (1992) study gives little quantitative data on 
performance, it reports that in both the Swedish and MBTA cases costs and 
performance have improved. However, in the MBTA case this was only achieved after 
an initial period of disruption caused by the franchise handover from Guilford and 
poor specification of capital ownership and operating costs. The SCRRA and 
Argentine franchises have only just begun operations, so evaluations of them are 
difficult, however the SCRRA franchise contract has been hailed as  the 'state of the 
art' rail passenger agreement in the country (NERA, 1992). The SCRRA franchise is 
a short term operating franchise, with a strong element of incentive payments to 
ensure contract enforcement and well specified service, maintenance and technical 
proposals. 
Can anything be learnt from the NERA (1992) study in relation to rail franchising in 
the UK? Firstly, it would appear that in all the cases the bidding process has not 
been very competitive and that the incumbentkperienced bidder is always successful. 
This could indicate that a large number of the UK franchises will go either to MEBOs 
or firms who have recruited large numbers of ex-BR management. Secondly, 
'operating franchises' are short term to allow franchise authorities to replace 
franchisees with minimum fuss, although in the MBTA case disruption ensued 
following replacement. The figures of 7 to 15 years being proposed for UK rail 
franchises would appear to be on the high side and would probably have to contain 
contingencies for changes in circumstances during the franchise period. Thirdly, the 
franchises should have detailed service and quality specifications, backing these up 
with incentive related payments to ensure execution. Fourthly, the franchising 
authority and regulator should have access to accounts and receive regular 
performance reports. 
3.4 Vertical Separation 
3.4.1 Background 
Historically railways have been viewed as  natural monopoly. According to Starkie 
(1984), 
"Railways ... are referred to as 'natural' monopolies in the sense that a single, vertically 
integrated firm can fulfil market demand more cheaply than two." 
This view reflects three characteristics of railways. Firstly, the size of unavoidable 
fived costs of production. Studies carried out by BRB and ITS (1979 and 1994) 
suggest that between 25% and 33% of railway's costs are accounted for by track and 
signalling and that between 50% to 80% of these infrastructure costs are fixed in the 
short term. Moreover, as Brewer (1994), points out infrastructure assets are 
geographically specific, have long asset lives, are indivisible and lack a comprehensive 
second-hand market, so reducing their value to scrap. Infrastructure is committed 
irreversibly to the railway market. 
It  is clear from this last point that infrastructure is a 'sunk cost', which is the second 
characteristic of railways. Only rarely is it feasible for any other rail operator to build 
new 'ways' and terminals to compete with the existing railway. Moreover, if the 
incumbent proceeded to behave in a predatory manner (covering only his operating 
costs) the entrant could not leave the industry without incurring considerable expense 
e.g. infrastructure. 
The third characteristic is that of the multi-product nature of rail industries. They 
serve different origins and destinations a t  different times. They also serve differing 
types of both passenger and freight traffic. Given fixed costs and indivisibilities this 
will give rise, according to Nash and Preston (19921, to both a large number of 'joint 
costs' and possible economies of scope. Such economies result from carrying different 
types of passengers on the same train rather than separate trains, or in relation to 
economies of density in that it is cheaper to provide freight and passenger services on 
one rather than two routes. The existence of such economies and the organisational 
problems of allocating 'joint costs' have led to the establishment of natural monopolies 
in rail provision. 
The result of these characteristics points towards an industry with 'declining costs', 
hence a natural monopoly. To restrict monopoly power and attain a welfare optimal 
level of output railways have traditionally been state monopolies. 
Recently, as noted by Preston (19941, this view has been challenged on three fronts. 
Firstly, from the theory of contestable markets promulgated by Baumol et al, and set 
out in section 3.2 of this working paper. Secondly, through a series of econometric 
studies that suggest constant returns to scale but increasing returns to density for the 
use of infrastructure. Moreover, studies carried out by Hasenklamp (1976). Brown et 
a1 (1979) and Oum and Yu (1991) found evidence of diseconomies oiscope where both 
freight and passenger trains are running on the same track. The evidence suggests 
that the only economies existing are those of density associated with infrastructure 
not rail operations. For a more in-depth review see Nash and Preston (section three, 
1992) or Preston (1994). 
The third challenge has its roots in Liebenstein's 'x-inefficiency', see Liebenstein 
(1966). Liebenstein identifies technical inefficiencies, resulting from state 
ownership/control, that originate from poor employee motivation and lack of 
understanding of the firm's production function caused by distortion in price signals. 
Such a view suggests that opening up rail provision to the market would reduce 'x- 
inefficiencies' and provide large savings on the present set-up of a state owned 
industry. Supporting evidence for this comes from Oum and Yu (1991) whose study 
showed positive evidence that railways will be 11% less efficient when provided as a 
'direct government agency' and 20% more efficient when provided as a 'quasi public 
corporation' than the organisational norm (state owned industry). Opposing evidence 
comes from Caves and Christensen (1980) whose studv com~ared aublic and ~ r iva t e  
railways in Canada, finding little statistical difference between both ownership types. 
This three pronged attack was encompassed into policy recommendations by David 
Starkie (1984). Firstly, the vertical separation of the rail industry, with 
infrastructure remaining, at  least initially, in public control but with operations split 
into units of various sizes and product homogeneity. Secondly, an 'open access' policy 
to ensure contestability. Thirdly, privatisation of the industry, an increase in 
managerial autonomy and a reduced subsidy level (to deal with X-ineficiency). The 
next section deals with horizontal disintegration, whilst this section will examine the 
issues raised by vertical separation and its role in Starkie's proposals. 
3.4.2 Problems 
Given Railtrack's mandate to cover costs and provide a rate of return on its capital 
assets, concern has been raised by Else (1994) and Nash and Preston (1993) that 
traffic will be priced out of the market at  the margin. Such traffic is capable of 
generating revenue greater than the additional costs it incurs, and as such is 
'profitable traffic'. Else (1994) develops this line of argument further noting that 
when one division of a company sells material inputs to another division which is 
responsible for the final product of that firm, the transfer price charged is set equal 
to marginal price e.g. the cost the division would avoid by not producing them. 
According to Else: 
"This then allows the purchasing division to set its price for the final product a t  a 
level which is most beneficial to the company as a whole, taking account of all 
relevant costs." 
The high percentage of fixed costs mean that Railtrack, as a separate concern is forced 
to price above marginal costs in order to break even. Not only does this price traffic 
a t  the margin out of the market it increases the fured cost payments for remaining 
traffic, which may price them out of the market, the so called cascading down of costs 
effect. The traditional response to this problem (BR's response) has been to 'charge 
what the traffic will beai. This results in price discrimination to recover a larger 
percentage of Gxed costs (higher charges) from traffic more suited to rail. The 
problem with Railtrack carrying out this approach is (1) it is separated from the final 
customers, so is less close to the market, (2) the regulator is unlikely to allow any 
undue discriminatory pricing, (3) franchise operators are likely to protest. 
Developing this argument further is problematic given, as acknowledged by Preston 
(1994), the lack of empirical evidence on the subject, Sweden being the only large 
scale railway to be vertical separated. However, using economic theory, a set of 
scenarios can be evaluated. Such an approach has been taken on board by Else and 
James (1993a and 199313). In their paper "Will the Fare be Fair?" they present a 
range of possible scenarios including, a 'bilateral monopoly', a 'complementary 
monopoly' and the present UK situation of a 'bilateral and complementary monopoly'. 
They examine the likely pricing and supply results from various rail organisations 
without strong regulation and assuming a unit demand curve. 
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The summary of their results can be seen in table 3.2 below. '.? .: -. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Results 
- 
Situation 
Pareto Efficiency 
Integrated Duopoly 
Integrated Monopoly 
Complementary Integrated MonopoIies 
Infrastructure Monopoly 
& Downstream Duopoly 
Bilateral Monopoly 
(with price-taking downstream operator) 
Bilateral & Complementary Monopoly 
(with pricetaking downstream operators) 
I 
Source: Else and James (1993a) 
Price 
c - constant marginal cost of infrastructure 
d - constant marginal cost of operating casts 
Output 
I t  can be noted that the only case producing a lower price than the integrated 
monopoly is the rather improbable 'competing integrated duopolist'. In fact the 
highest price results from a separate track authority and complementary monopoly 
(franchise authority). This organisational structure reduces service levels to a sixth 
of the pareto-efficient output and to a third of the integrated monopoly. Else and 
James go on to note that cost reductions of 50% would be insuff~cient o overcome the 
difference between the two organisational set ups. Despite the simplicity of Else and 
Jame's models (they omit quality variables, price discrimination and the complexities 
of rail cost structures), they do reiterate the potential problems of replacing one 
integrated monopoly with two separate monopolies and the increase in costs 
accompanying this e.g. 'double marginalisation'. The point is picked up by Dodgson 
(1993a) and Nash and Preston (1993). Dodgson (1993a) feels tihat Railtrack will have 
an incentive to exploit its monopoly position and raise charges considerable, especially 
when TOUs/franchises have a 'lender of the last resort' in the guise of the franchise 
director to bail them out. Nash and Preston (1993) are concerned with the lack of 
incentives for the efficient management of Railtrack's resources, in its present public 
sector form, and monopoly abuse when it is transferred to the private sector. These 
fears once again raise the issue of regulation and its effectiveness in ensuring that 
Railtrack does not abuse its monopoly position. 
Under the OfQ structure, almost all assets were assigned to one of the sector 
businesses. This gave managers direct day-to-day responsibility for the costs and 
quality of the infra-structure used by their trains. This maintained strong links 
between commercial planning and infrastructure planning and the commercial 
decisions of each sector. BR's 'Prime user' approach to infrastructure planning greatly 
increased the efficiency with which infrastructure was provided and utilised. Nash 
and Preston (1993) quote figures to back this up, (1) ratio of annual train operating 
revenue to track miles increasing from £96,831 per mile in 1985-86, to £125,619 in 
1990-91 (in 1990-91 prices), (2) a reduction in annual track, signal and 
telecommunication costs per track mile from £42,759 in 1985-86 to £34,937 in 1990-91 
(1990-91 prices). With a vertically separated rail structure these links are broken, 
furthermore the development of ROSCO's means that the only inputs into rail 
operations that managers will have direct control over is labour and marketing. The 
scope for innovative management is likely to be considerably reduced in this case. 
The 'link break' leads into the next question of deciding the levels and type of 
investment and the finance behind it. Railtrack is responsible for new irdrastructure 
investment and has several investment sources to choose from. Its main source comes 
from the income received from charges levied on train operators for track access and 
the lease income received for stations and depots. Other sources, are the National 
Loans Fund, government grants for desirable infrastructure schemes and private 
sector finance (the details of which the government is still setting out in the Private 
Finance Initiative) (see Department of Transport, 1994). One of the advantages from 
other UK privatisations has been the injection of private capital to fillance new 
investment, see Williams (1994) e.g. BT's digital switching. From the government's 
point of view it has also reduced the public sector borrowing requirement e.g. 
passenger and freight rolling stock, maintenance facilities, stations and ultimately 
track and signalling (through the sale of Railtrack) will privatise some £1.5 billion of 
capital investment per year (Williams, 1994). Such reasoning has also been behind 
the rail privatisations in Japan, Argentina and Germany. Helm and Thompson (1991) 
looked a t  the incentive to invest in the public sector throughout the 60's, 70's and in 
both the public and private sectors in the 80's. A summary of their results is 
presented in Table 3.3. During the 1960's and 1970's weak financial controls, together 
with targeted returns often less than the opportunity cost of capital and a poorly 
defined principavagent relationship (leading to managerial incentives to over invest), 
resulted in public utilities having an overall tendency to overinvest. The 1980's saw 
a reversal of this trend, largely as a result of the 1967 and 1978 White Papers and the 
1986 Byatt Report. These led to the implementation of direct financial controls, based 
on Long Run Marginal Cost principles and administered by the External Financing 
Limit (EFL), along with ex post constraints on investment. According to Helm and 
Thompson (1991) these measures reduced the incentive to invest to a neutral level. 
They identify under investment as a problem for privatised industries regulated by 
RPI-x when investment is sunk and not considered explicitly. The problem is one of 
'dynamic consistency' arising, with a risk that the regulator will ex post tighten price 
control. Knowing this the regulated f m  will be likely to underinvest e.g. British 
Airport Authority. Given the government's plans for the eventual sell off of Railtrack 
and the RPI-x regulation scheme presently being employed, this leads to the 
conclusion that Railtrack may tend to underinvest. Holding to Helm and Thompson's 
analysis the disbenefits of underinvestment will tend to be greater than those of 
overinvestment where absolute price elasticity is less than unity e.g. former Network 
South East services. 
Table 3.3: Investment Incentives and the Cost of OverrUnder Investment 
Ed - elasticity of demand 
Privatised ,BPI-x 
(with substantial 
sunk costs) 
Under 
invest 
Net social cost of 
underlover 
investment 
Source: Helm and Thompson (1991) 
In the short-term however Railtrack is constrained in the amount of investment it can 
undertake using finance raised on the open market. However, this doesn't necessarily 
mean a sharp curtailment in publicly funded investment. Since the separation of the 
Swedish railway, investment has increased almost tenfold. The increase is said to 
result from the 'clearer transparency' between investment and operating cost, 
facilitated by vertical disintegration, see the summary discussion in the ECMT Round 
Table report (1993). Policy makers are increasingly likely to fund a new investment 
project if they are assured that their funding is not leaking into operating costs. 
Public sector 80's 
Neutral Incentive to 
Assuming that a finance source is secured, a problem still remains in deciding the 
level and type of infrastructure investment that should take place. Railtrack has 
3 1 
Public sector 60's 
+ 70's 
Over 
Equal UndenOver 
for low Ed (and 
vice versa) 
UndenOver 
for low Ed (and 
vice versa) 
intimated that it will work closely with both passenger and freight operators to decide 
appropriate investment projects. Whilst it is likely that various schemes will be 
proposed the key point will be deciding the benefits and therefore, costs to appropriate 
users. It is to be hoped that there is a marked improvement in Railtrack's charge 
transparency to allow operators to discount costs and revenues over time. Any new 
investment will also require the cooperation of the ROSCO's to ensure that the leased 
rolling stock is capable of taking full advantage of the new investment e.g. 
electrification. The ROSCO's may want reassurances from the train operators that 
the new rolling stock will be leased, thus creating a further link in the investment 
process. 
Despite such criticisms, some commentators have greeted vertical disintegration with 
some enthusiasm. They see it as a genuine opportunity to harmonise the conditions 
of competition between transport modes. Gylee (1993) sees such potential and argues 
that for rail privatisation t o  proceed successfully the following pre-requisite must be 
met: 
"To have redefined the current rail subsidy as the legitimate revenues t o  the railway 
system, which arise simply because the highways are subsidised through various arms 
of taxation which also includes the corresponding inequitable and arbitrary charging 
of highway users ..., would allow the regulation of the privatised railway system to 
proceed in a more conventional manner." 
However, Gylee's (1993) notion fails to recognise first best .reasons for subsidising rail 
operations. Namely, the natural monopoly element of rail provision that means 
marginal cost pricing is not financially viable; the Mohring effect for user cost, that 
that an increase in train frequency reduces the average waiting time and so the 
passenger's cost of travel by train; and the network benefits when more directlthrough 
services are operated. 
In Sweden rail infrastructure charges are based upon the road model, incorporating 
environmental benefits and costs. Vertical separation of the rail industrv does offer 
the chance to treat rail and road infrastructuk consistently and fairly. ~ e c e n t l ~  the 
British have been making advances in this direction with promise of further action 
in this area, see Newbery (LTT, 17th March 1994). The establishment of the new 
Highways Agency, responsible for Britain's trunk mad and motorway system, mirrors 
to a certain extent the establishment of Railtrack. The Green Paper "Paying for 
Better Motorways" reviewed road taxation and proposed a number of alternative 
proposals. One of the options suggested replacing the current road track costings with 
capital costing, by means of an annual depreciation charge plus a required rate of 
return on the capital stock, which is the basis of Railtrack's financing system. 
Moreover, the SACTRA committee recommended in 1992 that there should be partial 
monetisation of environmental effects of road building. How far the government will 
go to putting road costs on a par with rail, and perhaps more importantly to what 
extent it will effect car use, are both debateable. The important thing is that the 
instruments are now in place to allow the creation of a more 'level playing field'. 
3.4.3 Summary: 
The main aim of Starkie's proposal (1984) for vertically separating the rail industry 
was to take out the 'sunk cost'lnatural monopoly element of rail provision and create 
a more contestable environment. In doing so several problems have been indirectly 
created. An increase in transaction costs between Railtrack and train operators; 
possible abuse of Railtrack's monopoly position; problems of co-ordinating investment 
in track infrastructure and rolling stock; problems of obtaining finance for new 
investment; concern about coordinating i n f r a s t ~ d ~ r e  maintenance and the 
responsibility for any delays caused; and the creation of operating managers who have 
no control over a vital input into their business, infrastructure. 
While a strong regulator, and close co-operation, may deal with the problems of 
monopoly abuse and investment co-ordination, the first and last problem appear 
unavoidable. Unless Railtrack is able to develop a reputation for delivering a reliable, 
fast service then it would be understandable if potential franchises were, in Dodgson's 
(1993) words: 
"...very reluctant to be dependent on another organisation for the day-to-day and year- 
to-year provision of their infrastructure." 
If the vertical separation of rail does encourage competition 'on the rails' and leads to 
the creation of a 'level playing field' between rail and road then all good and proper. 
However, whether such drastic action was required to achieve these objects is highly 
debateable. r 
Perhaps the final word should come from the Centre for Policy Studies (Redwood, 
1988) and their conference on rail privatisation. Discussion on setting up a separate 
track authority brought the following response: 
"The Secretary of State saw three difficulties in this model. First, the track authority 
itself would be a monopoly creating pricing and quality problems. Second, the track 
authority would be remote from the customers; responsibility and accountability for 
shortcomings on this morning or that would be hard to pin down. Third, investment 
would be hard to attract. Sir Christopher Foster of Lybrand and Cooper was 
especially damming about this model." 
3.5 Horizontal Separation 
The privatisation proposals not only create a vertically disintegrated rail industry, they 
have also lead to the creation of a horizontally separated rail operation industry, namely 
the 25 TOC'sIfranchises. The theme of this section will be the effect of horizontal 
disintegration in respect of minimum efficient size of rail operations, service co- 
ordination/provision of complementary services and network benefits. 
Section 3.4 briefly mentioned several econometric studies that led to the conclus~on that 
the only economies existing in the provision of rail services were those of density 
associated with infrastructure not rail operations. Tables 3.4 and 3.5, taken from Preston 
119941, present the aforementioned studies. 
Table 3.4 
Source: Preston, 1994 
Table 3.5 
Friedlander and Spady 
Caves et al. 
Harmatuck 
Harnis 
Keeler 
Caves et al. 
Friedlander et al. 
Source: Preston, 1994 
Returns 
to 
Density 
1.16 
- 
1.92 
1.72 
1.79 
1.76 
2.24(SR) 
4.03(LR) 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1977 
1974 
1985 
1993 
- 
Returns to Scale 
Foreman-Peck (1987) 
Dodgson (1993) 
McGeehan (1993) 
Fillippini and Maggi 
(1993) 
Fixed haul 
and trip 
length 
0.88-1.08 
1.01 
1.01 
0.93 
1.01 
0.98 
1.27(SR) 
Increased 
haul and 
trip length 
1.07-1.37 
1.13 
1.02 
1.02 
- 
1.00 
1.21(13) 
* Includes United States, Australia, Canada and India 
- 
Data 
(a) Britain 1865 
01) 12 countries 1910-40* 
(a) Britain 1912-Translog 
(b) Log Linear 
CIE 1973-1983 
Swiss Private Railways 
1985-88 
Returns to Scale 
1.05 
1.25 
(Capital Costs Only) 
1.00 
1.00 
0.99 
1.03-1.35 
Returns t n  Density 
0.81 
71.00 
1.38 
1.45-1.55 
The studies shown in Table 3.4 show constant returns to scale, which may increase 
slightly if trip length or length of haul vary. Conversely, they also show increasing 
returns to density (train km increased whilst network km are held constant), thus 
implying that economies of scale result from the use of infrastructure rather than 
operational factors (Preston, 1994). These studies are based on Class I North 
American rail operations which do not reflect the diverse, short haul characteristics 
of European railways. Table 3.5 presents the studies carried out based upon 
European rail operations, and again suggest constant returns to scale and increasing 
returns to density, although it should be noted that Dodgson (1993b) found 
diseconomies of density for the larger railways in Britain around 1912 and Fillippini 
and Maggi (1993) found increasing returns to scale for the small, private Swiss 
railways. 
The result of these studies and others carried out by Hasenklamp (1976), Brown et 
a1 (1979) and Oum and Yu (1991), is t o  suggest that horizontal separation will not 
reduce a rail operator's ability to produce at  minimum cost. In other words that rail 
operations exhibit constant average costs. 
The most recent study to examine economies of scale, density and scope is that by 
Preston (1994). The study uses a translog model of operating costs to test for such 
economies for 15 western European railways. Preston concludes that in terms of 
economies of scale with respect to operating costs, the smallest operators exhibit 
increasing returns, the medium sized operators exhibit constant returns and the 
largest operators exhibit decreasing returns. In terms of returns to density, with the 
exception of the most heavily used systems (Switzerland and Holland) all the 
operators exhibited increasing returns. These results suggest that to a certain degree 
the size of a network does matter. To minimise operating costs Preston suggests that 
the optimal railway would have a network of around 4,000 km, run 120 million train 
km per annum, giving it a density of around 30,000 train km per line km per annum. 
In the UK case this suggests splitting the rail network into four similar sized units. 
On this basis the division of the British railways into 25 passenger franchises and a t  
least six freight and parcel companies would not appear to be optimal, and a period 
of re-agglomeration may be anticipated in the medium to long term. It is important 
to note that Preston's conclusions apply to network activities, some branch lines may 
be operated efficiently as free standing units e.g. micro-franchising. 
The provision of complementary services is another issue raised by horizontal 
separation. The problem arises because of the interdependency between different 
operators in terms of providing and attracting passengers e.g. Intercity rely to a great 
extent upon Regional railways to provide passengers. The actions of a Regional 
operator will therefore have repercussions for an. Intercity operator's revenue. A 
problem occurs when a service is unprofitable for an independent operator but could 
be profitable for a more integrated concern. As Else (1994) acknowledges, the problem 
may be overcome if train operators are willing to pay compensation to another 
operator to run a particular service. However, such an approach requires detailed 
information and could become very complex if more than one operator is involved. To 
an extent this problem is negated by the franchise director who provides 
compensation, in the form of subsidy, to train operators for a specified level of service. 
However, the efficiency of such a second best approach must be questioned. A single 
integrated organisation would surely be better aware of such interdependencies to 
identify all possible optimal arrangements quickly and with minimum information 
costs. 
Further issues raised by 'horizontal separation' can be grouped under the heading of 
'network benefits'. They are: 
(1) Co-ordinatedlintegrated timetables and publicity. 
(2) Through ticketing. 
(3) Inter availability of tickets. 
Producing a national co-ordinated and integrated timetable is the responsibility of 
Railtrack. Initially the TOC's will propose the services they wish t o  operate. 
Railtrack will then assemble the proposals into a workable whole, eliminating conflicts 
along the way. The timetable will be changed every six months and will also have to 
accommodate 'open access' operators, minor changes may also be permitted. Such a 
timetable is of major importance to rail passengers, especially for trips involving 
interchange with two or more TOC's. The timetable should have the characteristics 
of allowing passengers to plan their journeys with a large degree of certainty and 
minimise passenger interchange time. With %orizontal separation', the complexities 
of producing such a timetable have increased, especially given 'open access'. There 
is also some confusion on the allocation mechanism for train paths, will such 
allocation follow a commercial or a social criteria? For example, will Intercity 
services take priority over local services? A further issue is the publicity of the 
national timetable, Railtrack have a responsibility to produce it but the costs of 
publicising it may dampen Railtrack's publicity fervour. Already, the Rail Users 
Consultative Committee (RUCC) have claimed; 
"...since the break-up of BR into different operators, passengers are finding it harder 
t o  obtain information about tickets and timetables in other parts of the country." 
(Source: Yorkshire Post, 15/6/94) 
This may just be a teething problem, soon to be soothed away when Railtrack and the 
TOC's realise that i t  makes commercial sense to co-ordinate services. The danger is 
lack of co-ordination and reduced network benefits for the passenger. 
The government has given assurances that 'through ticketing' will continue, however 
no such guarantees have been given for the continued inter availability of ticketing. 
If tickets are not made inter available this will represent a huge loss in network 
benefits for the rail passengers, reducing the number of trains available to them. For 
example, travelling between Leeds and Wakefield, passengers have a choice between 
East Coast Main Lime and North East Regional trains. Withdrawing inter availability 
of ticketing will reduce this choice to either East Coast Main Line or North East 
Regional trains (and possiblylor open access trains) trains. This leads to the loss of 
the Mohring effect benefits referred to earlier. 
Whether inter availability of ticketing is retained will depend to a large extent on the 
methods used to allocate fare revenue. If 'smart card' technology were available the 
inter availability of ticketing would be less of a concern for TOCs. For the moment 
allocation of fare revenue is likely to rely on the forecasting models used by BR. This 
may be acceptable, in the short term, t o  the TOCs, but their views may change in the 
long term with the predicted entry of 'open access' operators into the market. If 'open 
access' operators were to enter the market and operate peak services only, the TOCs 
might want to exclude such passengers from returning on their own trains during the 
'off peak'. The issue may ultimately rest with the regulator, who might interpret such 
practices as predatory behaviour. 
3.5.1 Summary: 
The main argument to come out of this section is that the creation of 25 rail operating 
franchises is unlikely to be optimal, in the sense of allowing rail operators to  take 
advantage of cost economies, or in providing revenue maximising services at  the 
margin. Concern is also expressed as regards Network Benefits especially the 
maintenance of inter availability of ticketing. 
The issues of inter availability of ticketing, through ticketing, concessionary fares and 
discounted fares are politically very sensitive and so it is understandable that the 
government has been keen to stress they will continue in some form. Realistically, 
it would not be surprising if some restrictions were to evolve in the long-term, 
especially in relation to inter ayailability of ticketing and discounted fares,- 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The first part of this paper described the proposals for rail privatisation in Great 
Britain. In subsequent sections we turned to an examination of the light that 
economic theory could shed on the likely effects of privatisation. First, we considered 
the extent to which rail transport could be considered to be a contestable market. The 
British proposals here were particularly ingenious in attempting to create a 
contestable market for train operations, both for the franchises and via open access. 
However, there remained doubts about some aspects, especially the scope for 'hit and 
run' entry by open access operators without the incumbent being able to respond. 
Secondly, the theory of franchising was considered. Here there were doubts about the 
degree of competition and the scope the successful franchisee would have to 
renegotiate terms during the life of the franchise. 
The third area examined was vertical and horizontal integration. Whilst vertical 
disintegration was very helpful in promoting competition, a number of potential 
disadvantages were identified, including increased transaction costs, the risk of poorer 
planning of the system and a lack of competitive pressure on Railtrack. Horizontal 
disintegration risked the formation of companies below minimum efficient size, as well 
as  a possible loss of some forms of network benefits such as through and 
interchangeable tickets. 
In conclusion, it is not possible to reach any firm predictions of the results of the 
British rail privatisation on the basis of theory. What is clear is that in designing a 
very complex and innovative form of privatisation to maximise the potential for 
competition, the British government has introduced many features which may create 
serious problems. In an attempt to simplify the issues and potential problems Table 
4.1 sets out future hypotheses that will require future attention. Whether these are 
so serious as to outweigh the benefits of increased competition will only be known 
after many years of experience. 
Against the Pn~puxals 
Allocative efficiency will ha reduced 
thmugh either the operatim uI'mo~.c 
trains hut at hipher plicex (small 
group competitiun) 
or 
the operation of less trains a 
prices (monopuly). 
There will he wmr. sccrpe Fur  incrcns<,d 
productivity efieiency lpanieulnrly f i r  
infrastracture and vchiele 
maintenance) hut may he rrll'.;rt hy 
other factors. 
Dynamic efficiency will not hc 
increased. Thew may he: 
*Excessive pmduct differrntiatiun 
(small group competition) 
*Limited innovation (monopoly. large 
p u p  competition). 
There will he a loss of network 
benefits and the incursion of negative 
externalities (congestion, accidents. 
envimnmental costs) may he 
significant. 
Net social benefit will he decreased. 
Passenger volumes will decr&*e and 
passenger service levels will decrease. 
There is greater technological linkage 
hetween operations and infrasttueture 
for rail than mads. 
Infrastmture planning requires 
detailed knowledge of oprratiuns. 
Railtrack one step rrmored fi.um the 
market. Information asymmetries. 
Railtrack has a monopoly. Will oRen 
SeNe a monopoly operator. Potential 
pmblem of bilateral monopoly. 
Danger of regulatory capture. RPI-x 
may lead to under investment. 
T a b l e  4.1: Summary 
Hypothesis to he tested 
Overall A-sessment 
Vertical Separation 
Efficient pricing and access regimes 
can be established. 
Points 
For the Proposals 
Allocative efficiency will be increased 
thmugh the operation of more trains 
and more efficient pricing. 
Productive efficiency will he increased 
through the introduction of private 
sector practices. 
Dynamic efficiency will he increased as 
a result of greater innovation. 
There will be no loss of network 
benefits nor any negative externalities. 
Net social benefit will be increased. 
Passenger volumes will increase and 
passepger sewice levels will increase. 
Will put rail on a similar basis to mads 
Will place greater emphasis on 
infrastructure maintenance and 
pmvision. 
Contracting out and ultimately 
privatisation will innease efficiency in 
infiust~cture pmvision. 
Regulatory incentives can be designed 
to ensure optimum quality 
(performance payments) and 
investment (RPI-x) 
Pricing will not he efficient if: 
*Railtrack required to operate without 
lump sum subsidy. 
*Discrimination pmhihited. 
Modern Equivalent Asset Value 
appmach correctly determines 
capital costs 
MEAV appmach over-estimater capital 
costs. 
I More efficient use will be made of land holdings, station floorspaca etc. ... &ope for cmss suhsidy hetween rail operators and other activities reduced. 
Horizontal Separation 
Contrdability 
On-the-track Competition 
('Open Access') 
Off-the-track Competition 
('Franchising') 
Organisational Issues 
Smaller companies will be more 
efficient and more in touch with their 
markets. 
Operators exhibit constant returns to 
scale. 
Raid industry can support a large 
number of train operating units. 
Rail operations have near zero sunk 
costs and few harriers to entry andexit. 
Reaction periods long making 'hit and 
nm' entry feasible. 
Rail operations contestable. Prices and 
service levels will not vary with market 
concentration. 
Will be substantial. 
Will lead to improvements in 
productive, allocative and dynamic 
efficiency. 
Will not lead to losses of cost and 
demand complementarities. 
Can he made compatible with 
f ra~bis ing.  
Will be substantial. 
Bidding will be competitive. 
Bidding will be based on net suhsidy. 
Contract specification not a major issue. 
PreferSnce for short term, operating 
contracts of relatively large size. 
Noncompliant bids can be dealt with. 
Contracts can be eas* enforced. 
Handover not an issue. 
Splitting BR into c.100 units will make 
transactions more transparent and 
henee mure effient. 
Developments in IT have reduced 
transaction ca%ts. 
There will be no .conflicts between the 
new orpsnisations. 
Transitional msts will he insignificant. 
Very #mall ur vely large cl,mpnnie+ 
will he inefficient. 
Operations sxhihit i n ~ r e a s i n ~  trtm.ns 
up to a minimum elficient rcnl<x. 
Beyond a maximum eficiont scale 
may exhihit dec~pasin~ returns. 
Optimum numhrr ul' train upl.~linn 
units only 2-3 mer~elx likely. 
Human capital a substantial sunk 
costs. 
Reaction periods short (ecpecially in 
t e r n  of price). 
Rail operations not contestable. 
Prices and senices levels will vary 
with market mncent~ation. 
- 
Will be limited tu 'cherry piekind. 
May lead to improvements in 
pmductive and dynamic eflieiency but 
deterioration in dynamic efficiency. 
Will lead to losses of cost and demand 
cumplementaritiex. 
Incompatible with franchising. 
Will be limited. 
Biddinl: will not he competitive. 
Alternative hidding regimes should he 
considered. 
Contract specification a major issue. 
Argnment for long term and exclusive 
complete Contracts of variable size 
(including micro-franchising). 
Noncompliant hide dimcult to assess. 
Contracts diflicult to enfurce. 
~andm& is an issue. 
Splitting BR into c.100 units will 
increas numher uf transactions and 
reduce efficiency. 
Developments in IT have had little 
effect on transaction cost.. 
There am conflicts between the 
ohjectivea of OPRAF and ORR. 
'hansitional costs will be ~ignieant .  
APPENDIX ONE 
South Wales & 
This is a joint figure for both MML and Cross Country 
Joint figures with Chiltern 
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